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THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT IN
CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Congress has provided that in certain cases which are otherwise
properly before a federal district court, a special district court com-
posed of three judges, one of whom must be a circuit judge, is re-
quired.' Theoretically, this requirement is procedural assurance that
important litigation will receive commensurate consideration in the
federal district courts.2 One type of litigation which Congress has
deemed to merit this special treatment is a suit to enjoin enforcement
of a state statute or administrative order on grounds of unconstitution-
ality.3 While the three-judge statute is relatively simple in theory, it
has proven quite complex in practice and has been a frequent source
of controversy. 4 Several recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have focused attention upon 28 United States Code section
2281,r providing inspiration for a number of commentators.' Within
'See generally ROBERTSON & KIRxAN, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951). Three judges
are required, for example, in: suits to set aside ICC orders, 28 U.S.C. § 2325
(1964) ; anti-trust and railroad cases certified to be of public importance by
the Attorney General, 15 U.S.C. § 28, 49 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45 (1964); condemnation
proceedings under the T.V.A. Act, 16 U.S.C. § 83(x) (1964); suits to enjoin
enforcement of a federal statute on the ground of its unconstitutionality, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2282 (1964); and certain cases under the Civil Rights Act of July 2, 1964,
§§ 101(d) (voting discrimination), 206(b) (public accommodations), and 707(b)(employment) (1964).
'The three-judge statute "was intended to embrace a limited class of cases of
special importance and requiring special treatment in the interests of the public...
Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567 (1928).
S28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964)provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order
made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes,
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground
of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is
heard and determined by a district court of three judges under Section 2284
of this title.
For a historical discussion of the statute including the modifications made since
its enactment in 1910, see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SysTEm 849 (1953).
'See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1964); Comment, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 539 (1963); Note,
47 GEo. L. J. 161 (1958). See also the cases collected in HART & WECHSLER, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 843-90.
'E.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713 (1962) ; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) ; Kesler v. Department
of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
'Of particular inspiration to this writer was the exhaustive undertaking of
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CH.
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the context of an examination of two recent Supreme Court decisions,
Swift & Co. v. Wickkam and the decision reversed therein, Kesler v.
Department of Public Safety,' this Note will undertake an evaluation
of the three-judge requirement today.
I. HISTORICAL SKETCH
The three-judge requirement was a product of the times, originating
in an era of economic turbulence, social reform, and political unrest.
At the beginning of this century, both state and national governments
were attempting to control and regulate various economic activities.
Spearheaded by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, the federal effort was
directed at "Big Business" in the form of anti-trust litigation. 10 State
regulation took the form of taxation and rate controls, particularly
in such expanding industries as railroads and public utilities." Per-
meating this era were strong feelings of federalism; indeed, the dis-
tribution of power between the states and the federal government was
of vital concern.' This period was also instrumental in the develop-
ment of the federal court system, particularly as guardian of federal
constitutional rights." At the same time, the federal equity power
was essentially uncurtailed, being entirely discretionary with the trial
judge. 4 Consequently, when the Supreme Court upheld the equity
power of a federal judge to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional
state statute' in Ex parte Young,"0 it is not surprising that a vigorous
L. REv. 1 (1964). Other outstanding works include: Note, 77 HARv. L. PEv. 299
(1963); Comment, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 1528 (1963); Comment, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
555 (1960); Comment, 49 VA. L. REv. 538 (1963); and Comment, 72 YALE L. 3.
1646 (1963).
'382 U.S. 111 (1965), 11 VILL. L. REv. 649 (1966).
369 U.S. 153 (1962), 76 HARv. L. REv. 168 (1962), 15 STAN. L. REv. 565
(1963), 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113 (1962).
'Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REv. 795, 808 (1934).
See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1927).
"°FRANKFURT & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREmE COURT 104 (1927).
'Comment, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA.
L. REV. 538, 540 (1963).
"See Lockwood, Maw & Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction in
Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 426, 428 (1930). See generally Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 519 (1928); Lillienthal, The Federal Courts and State
Regulation of Public Utilities, 43 HAv. L. REv. 379 (1930).
"Hutcheson, supra note 9, at 807-10.
"Id. at 801-02.
A Minnesota statute established reduced rates for railroads and provided
remedies and penalties for noncompliance. See HART & WEcHSLER, op. cit. siepra
note 3, at 816-20.16209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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controversy ensued.1 7 As a compromise,"s Congress enacted the three-
judge statute, 9 borrowing the idea of a court of special dignity from
a device which had been successful in certain anti-trust and interstate
commerce litigation.20 Congress was thus able to retain the federal
equity power of Young to safeguard federal constitutional rights,"'
and, at the same time, protect the states against improvidently issued
federal injunctions which could frustrate statutes representing the
collective wisdom and policy of a state legislature.2 Although perhaps
directed at a precise evil23 the three-judge requirement reflected many
considerations.24 Deference to state pride and dignity was a major, if
" See generally 42 CONG. R.Ec. 4847-59 (1908). Typical remarks include the
following by Senator Overman of North Carolina, one of the sponsors of the
original three-judge act, id. at 4847:
[W]e have come to a sad day when one subordinate Federal judge can
enjoin the officer of a sovereign State from proceeding to enforce the laws
of the State .... That being so, there... [is] great feeling [against] the fact that
one Federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State....
Another proponent, Senator Bacon from Georgia, said, id. at 4853:
If these [federal] courts are to exercise the power of stopping the operation
of the laws of a State and of punishing the officers of a State, then at least
let it be done on notice and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three
judges to decide such questions, and not permit such dangerous power to one
man.
' Comment, 49 VA. L. Ray. 538, 542 (1963).
" Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557. The original statute has
been amended several times, and is now codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284
(1964), set out in note 3 supra. For a discussion of the changes in the original
statute, see HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 849.
' The Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, provided for the convening of
three circuit judges in any case under the Anti-Trust Act or the Act to Regulate
Commerce certified to be of general importance by the Attorney General. HART
& WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47-48, 849. See also Hutcheson, supra
note 9, at 810.
' The rationale underlying Young was the "not implausible conviction that
federal constitutional rights could not be adequately protected without the inter-
vention of federal equity...." Currie, supra note 6, at 4. See also HART & WECHSLER,
op cit. supra note 3, at 814-20.
'See Cumberland Tel. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212 (1922),
quoted at note 29 infra.
' I.e., abuses of the then unrestricted interlocutory injunction power of the
federal judge and the concomitant disruption of state taxes and rate control measures.
See Comment, The Three-Jitdge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A
Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHi. L. REv. 555, 563 (1960), where the student
contends that these precise evils no longer exist and hence the three-judge court
should be abolished. This contention is disputed by many commentators, however.
See Currie, supra note 6, at 12; Comment, 49 VA. L. Rav. 538, 569 (1963) ; Note, 77
HARv. L. Rav. 299, 301-03 (1963). Compare Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1649-52
(1963).
"' See Hutcheson, supra note 9, at 810. Indeed, many factors are reflected in
the solution provided by Congress. See generally, Currie, supra note 6, at 3-12.
"The three-judge provisions ... are products of battles between competing political
forces over four persistent and significant issues: judicial review, national supre-
macy, sovereign immunity, and the use of the injunction." Id. at 3. See also Comment,
49 VA. L. REv. 538, 542-45 (1963).
As to Congress' objectives, one commentator remarks: "the task of identifying
the particular state interest Congress intended to protect is a matter of some
difficulty...." Note, 77 HA v. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1963).
1966]
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not dominant, factor in 1910.2 Implicit was a not unjustified lack
of confidence in the integrity and ability of federal judges.' Also
influential was the omnipresent ingredient of federalism: 27 an injunc-
tion issued by three federal judges is less intolerable to a state than
one issued by a single federal judge.28 Moreover, it has been suggested
that Congress recognized the delicate interests at stake and therefore
sought to ensure greater deliberation in the federal courts by providing
a solemn, deliberate judicial proceeding.2" To expedite the disposition
of such important litigation, a prompt procedure30 and direct appeal
to the United States Supreme Court were provided.3 1
Hutcheson, suepra note 9, says at 804-05:
The third mischief [which the three-judge requirement was intended to cor-
rect] was the indignity and injustice which it was felt was being done to the
states in having their solemn legislative acts, and the efforts of state officers
to enforce them, impeded, perhaps frustrated, by the interlocutory fiat of a
single judge, issued ... practically without limitation or safeguard except the
discretion of the issuing judge. This was the mischief that lay at the root of
all the others, dictating the form of the statute, and giving power and reach
to the arms of those who contended for its enactment.
But see Note, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 299, 300 (1963).
' Comment, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 540 (1963); HART & WEcHSLER, op. cit. supra
note 3. at 47.
' See Lockwood, Maw & Rosenberry, smpra note 12, at 428, 448-50; Comment,
72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1649-50 (1963). In the Senate debate following Ex parte Young,
Senator Burkett of Nebraska described the contemporary situation as follows,
42 CON G. REc. 4848 (1908) :
[T]here was a very strained condition between Federal and State authority.
It apparently would have taken only a match thrown into the box of tinder to
have exploded the whole thing.
See also Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927),
where the Court said:
But public interest demands that, whenever possible, conflict between the two
authorities [state and federal governments] and irritation be avoided. To
this end it is important that the federal power be not asserted unnecessarily,
hastily, or harshly. It is important also that demands of comity and courtesy,
as well as of the law be deferred to ....
SIn the Senate debates, Senator Overman said, 42 CONG. REc. 4847 (1908):
[I]f this substitute is adopted and three judges have to pass upon the question
of the constitutionality of a State statute and three great judges say the statute
is unconstitutional, the officers of the State will be less inclined to resist the
orders and decrees of our Federal courts....
See also the remarks of Senator Bacon, note 17 supra.
Cumberland Tel. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 216 (1922):
The wording of the statute leaves no doubt that Congress was by provisions
ex industria seeking to make interference by interlocutory injunction from
a federal court with the enforcement of a state legislation, regularly enacted and
in course of execution, a matter of the adequate hearing and the full delibera-
tion which the presence of three judges ... was likely to secure. It was to
prevent the improvident granting of such injunctions by a single judge, and the
possible unnecessary conflict between federal and state authority always to be
deprecated.
Accord, Currie, supra note 6, at 7; Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 303 (1963) ; Note,
15 STAN. L. REv. 565, 567 (1963).
28 U.S.C. § 2284(4) (1964) now provides: "In any such case the application shall
be given precedence and assigned for a hearing at the earliest practicable day...."
8128 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) now provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
[VOL. 41 :856
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II. THE THREE-JUDGE STATUTE IN THE COURTS
In addition to determining whether the requisite elements of federal
jurisdiction are presented, 2 the federal district judge must examine
a complaint to determine whether three judges are required pursuant
to section 2281 .1 If he determines that three judges are required, he
immediately notifies the chief justice of the circuit who then orders
the prompt convening of the three-judge court. 4 Unfortunately, this
determination is frequently not an easy task; 3  many problems of
interpretation have arisen throughout the three-judge statute's some-
what turbid history: What is a "state statute"?8" Who is a state
"officer"? 3 7 What is the meaning of "unconstitutional"?38 Conse-
quently, the three-judge requirement presents considerable practical
Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an inter-
locutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding re-
quired by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.
See also Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 569 (1928).
' See Note, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 299, 306-10 (1963); Comment, 49 VA. L. REv.
538, 546-47 (1963).
Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928). 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964) specifies the pro-
cedure for convening a three-judge court. See Fiumura v. Texaco, Inc., 240 F. Supp.
325, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1965), where the court said: "[T]he district judge to whom the
application is made must as an independent judicial function determine whether.., the
case is one required to be determined by a three-judge statutory court."
" Fiumura v. Texaco, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 325, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (Biggs, Chief
Judge) :
The chief judge of the circuit shall... exercise as an independent function hisjudgment as to whether or not the case is one which requires determination
by a three-judge statutory court. In short, the concurrence of the separate and
independent judicial acts of the district judge and the chief judge of the
circuit is required for the constituting of a three-judge statutory court.
'Currie, supra note 6, at 13. See Comment, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 547-55 (1963).
" For an excellent discussion of the problems of interpreting "state statutes,"
see Currie, supra note 6, at 29-49. See also Comment, 49 VA. L. Rv. 538, 548-50(1963) ; Note, 7Tree-Judge Court---"Meaning of State Statute" 30 N.C.L. Rv. 423
(1952).
'Although the other requisites of the three-judge statute are present, threejudges are not required where the defendants are local officers rather than state
officers. Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 568 (1928). For a general discussion of
the construction problems, see Comment, 49 VA. L. Rv. 538, 550-51 (1963).
' The claim of "unconstitutionality" must not be frivolous. Ex parte Poresky,
290 U.S. 30 (1933).
The United States Supreme Court has construed "unconstitutional" in several
recent decisions. In Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), 50 CALIF. L. R-v.
728, plaintiff Negroes sought to enjoin enforcement of Mississippi statutes which
required racial segregation in transportation facilities. Although several Supreme
Court decisions had clearly established that a state can not require racial segregation
of transportation facilities, the three-judge court abstained pending possible con-
struction of these laws by the Mississippi courts. Upon direct appeal, the Court
held that three judges are not required under § 2281 when "prior decisions make
frivolous any claim that a state statute on its face is not unconstitutional."




difficulty for the district judge charged with making the threshold de-
termination of whether three judges are requiredY
The three-judge requirement has proven to be equally troublesome
for litigants and for the courts. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has done little to ameliorate this situation; 40 to the contrary, several
recent decisions seem to have exacerbated it.4 1 Also productive of
difficulty is the complicated nature of the three-judge appellate pro-
visions.4 2
Repeatedly emphasizing the demands which the three-judge re-
quirement supposedly makes upon the federal judiciary, the Supreme
Court has avowedly adopted a policy of strict construction of section
228 1.4  Frequently recited is the burden imposed upon the lower
courts: convening three judges is cumbersome and disrupts the normal
operation of the federal courts, especially in non-metropolitan areas.44
Also noted, and of perhaps more significance, is the burden imposed
upon the Court itself by virtue of mandatory direct review of three-
See Currie, supra note 6, at 23.
40Chief Justice Warren seemed to recognize this when he said in Kesler v.
Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 175 (1962) (dissenting opinion):
When to convene a three-judge court has always been a troublesome problem
of federal jurisdiction and a review of the cases involving that question
illustrates the difficulty the lower courts have had in applying the principles
formulated by this court....
4E.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), discussed in note 38 supra,
holding that three judges are not required when the state statute is clearly un-
constitutional. This thrusts upon the district judge the difficult task of deter-
mining when prior decisions have clearly established that the challenged statute
is unconstitutional. Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 315-16 (1963); Comment, 61
Micn. L. REv. 1528, 1533-34 (1963). Bailey v. Patterson was followed in Turner
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). See also Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), discussed infra.
2 -An examination of the problems of appellate review in three-judge litigation
is beyond the scope of this undertaking. For an excellent discussion, see Com-
ment, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. Ruv
538, 555-69 (1963).
' Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). The Phillips opinion,
generally cited as authority for this proposition, was written by Justice Frank-
furter who has spearheaded the Court's restrictive view of the three-judge re-
quirement. See Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1962) ;
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1960)
(dissenting opinion); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BusINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 255-94 (1928).
"E.g., "[t]he requirement of three judges, of whom one must be a... circuit
judge, entails a serious drain upon the federal judicial system particularly in
regions where, despite modern facilities, distance still plays an important part in
the effective administration of justice. And all but the few great metropolitan
areas are such regions. . . ." Justice Frankfurter in Phillips v. United States,
312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). See also Kesler v. Department of Pubic Safety, 369
U.S. 153, 156 (1962); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362
U.S. 73, 92 (1960) (dissenting opinion). But see Hutcheson, A Case for Three
Judges, 47 HAnv. L. REv. 795, 826 (1934), quoted infra note 91.
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judge determinations." In short, the Court, motivated by a perhaps
misguided concern for judicial efficiency, has consistently curtailed
the scope of section 2281 despite its seemingly strong underlying
policy considerations.46
III. "UNCONSTITUTIONALITY" UNDER SECTION 2281:
THE Su IwACY CLAUSE
The Court's restrictive attitude was again manifested in two recent
decisions construing the "unconstitutionality" requirement of section
2281.17 Although this requirement has been in existence for over fifty
years, the Supreme Court had never considered the precise question
whether a claim that a state statute was in conflict with a federal
statute-a violation of the supremacy clause of the Constitution-was
a ground of "unconstitutionality" within the meaning of section 2281."
An early three-judge court had answered this question affirmatively,49
but subsequent Supreme Court decisions seemed to the contrary."
In fact, as a result of these decisions, many authorities thought that
three judges were not required in supremacy clause cases.5' None-
theless, in 1960, a Utah federal district judge had three judges con-
vened under section 2281 upon receipt of a complaint in which the
only ground of unconstitutionality alleged was a potential violation
of the supremacy clause.52 The three-judge court upheld the validity
of the Utah statute and plaintiff appealed on the merits directly to the
United States Supreme Court.53
-E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93
(1960) (dissenting opinion); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
See also note 92 and text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
"See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 849.
"See note 38 supra.
"See Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 157-58 (1963), quoted
in part in note 54 infra.
" Michigan Central R.R. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, 271 Fed. 319 (E.D.
Mich. 1921).
'Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354
(1940) ; Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926). Compare the Court's "reinterpretation'
of these three decisions in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 122 (1965).
"Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113, 115-16 (1962); Note, 15 STAN. L. REv. 565,
568-69 (1963). Indeed, in 1960 one authority stated: "A three judge court is not
required under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, where the objection to a state statute and its
application is that it is in conflict with a federal statute and that thereby the
supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution is violated." Annot, 4 L.Ed. 2d
1931, 1962 (1960). See also Bell v. Waterfront Comn'n, 279 F.2d 853, 858-59
(2d Cir. 1960).
"In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277 (D. Utah 1960). It is interesting to note
that the district judge receiving the complaint requested three judges, perceiving
no issue as to whether supremacy clause cases were within § 2281. Compare Bell v.
W aterfront Comm'n, 183 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
' Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
1966] COMMENTS
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IV. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety
Before considering the merits, the Court noted a "preliminary point
of jurisdiction ... though it was not adverted to either by the Dis-
trict Court or by the parties. Was this a proper case for convening
a three-judge court.. .?,4 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frank-
furter, found that three judges were properly convened. Justice Frank-
furter pointed out that section 2281 draws no distinction among
various constitutional provisions,5 5 but, rather than overrule the line
of authority generally considered to make such a distinction, he chose
to distinguish these cases as presenting issues of statutory construc-
tion.56 Thus, Kesler established the following test for supremacy
clause cases under section 2281:17
If in immediate controversy is not the unconstitutionality of a state
law but merely the construction of a state law or the federal law,
the three-judge requirement does not become operative.
Because the unconstitutionality of the Utah law was in "immediate
controversy," three judges were properly convened.
Because the three-judge court was properly convened, the Court
had jurisdiction to review the merits on direct appeal. To resolve
the substantive issue5" Justice Frankfurter undertook an extensive
369 U.S. at 155. If three judges were not required, the Supreme Court is withoutjurisdiction to entertain the direct appeal on the merits; appeal in such instances
lies to the circuit court of appeals. ROBERTSON & KIRKMAN, JURISDICTION OF
THE SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 (2d ed. 1951). Note, The Three-
Audge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 567-68 (1963).
'Justice Frankfurter states, 369 U.S. at 156:
[Appeal should be allowed] unless invalidation of a state statute by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause rests on a different constitutional basis than such invalidation
because of conflict with any other clause of the Constitution, at least to the extent
of reading such an implied exception into the procedure devised by § 2281. Neither
the language of § 2281 nor the purpose which gave rise to it affords the remotest
reason for carving out an unfrivolous claim of unconstitutionality because of the
Supremacy Clause from the comprehensive language of § 2281.
6369 U.S. at 157-58. "This case presents a sole, immediate constitutional
question, differing from Buder, Bransford, and Case, which presented issues of
statutory construction even though perhaps eventually leading to a constitutional
question." Id. at 158.
'71d. at 157.
' The substantive issue concerned an alleged conflict between Utah's Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-14(a) (1960) and
§ 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). The
Utah statute provided for suspension of the driving privileges of debtors having
unsatisfied judgments against them. On the other hand, § 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act provides that a discharge in bankruptcy relieves the debtor from all provable
debts. In Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme Court upheld a New
York statute which provided for automatic suspension of driving privileges upon
However, the Utah statute did not provide automatic suspension; rather, it permitted
failure to satisfy a judgment as a valid exercise of the state's "police power."
the creditor to determine whether the driver's privileges should be suspended.
[VOL. 41 : 856
discussion of the statutes in controversy. 9 Many viewed this review
as "statutory construction," thereby giving rise to considerable con-
fusion as to just what the Kesler "immediate controversy" test en-
tailed 0 One thing was clear: the Kesler ruling further complicated
the district judge's already difficult task of determining when three
judges are required."' After Kesler, the district judge must deter-
mine, first, what "statutory construction" is, and second, when the
meanings of the statutes are sufficiently clear so that no statutory
construction will be necessary before the constitutional issue is
reached. The commentators forecast considerable difficulty in the
application of such a technical rule."2
This criticism proved to be well-founded. In 1964, two large turkey
processing companies, Swift and Armour, found themselves unable to
comply with inconsistent federal and New York State package labeling
requirements. 3 After the federal agency denied their request to mod-
As pointed out by the Court, 369 U.S. at 165, twenty-one states had similar
financial responsibility provisions. Consequently, this question, which was not
answered in Reitz v. Mealy, supra, was now of considerable importance. This
aspect of the Kesler case is discussed in Note, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term,
76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 150-52 (1962) ; Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113, 119-22 (1962).
' 369 U.S. at 158-74.
In the dissent, Chief Justice Warren maintained that statutory construction
was always necessary in supremacy clause cases, 369 U.S. at 177-78 & n.13, and
contended that "the Court's opinion refutes the very test which it establishes...!'
369 U.S. at 177. It is equally plausible that the extensive statutory discussion
need not be viewed as "construction"; indeed, the meaning and application of the
relative statutes was clear: the issue confronting the Court was whether the
conflict between the provisions justified invalidation of the state statute under the
supremacy clause. See Note, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 168, 169 (1962); Note, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 113, 116-17 (1962). Another reading of Kesler is that the "immediate
controversy" test applies only to the three-judge court. Thus, whether the Supreme
Court engages in "statutory construction" is immaterial with respect to whether
a three-judge court may do so. As one writer points out, the jurisdictional
question must be distinguished from the substantive question. Comment, 61 MicH.
L. REv. 1528, 1536 (1962). Moreover, it is possible that the Court coincidentally
took the opportunity in Kesler to resolve the important substantive issue of the
apparent conflict between state financial responsibility laws and the federal Bank-
ruptcy Act. See note 58 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
'In a footnote in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, at n.20 (1965), the
Court cited the folloing authorities as critical of Kesler: Note, 77 HARv. L. REv.
299, 313-15 (1963); 76 HARv. L. REv. 168 (1962); 15 STAN. L. Rv. 565 (1963);
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHi.
L. REv. 1, 61-64 (1964); 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113 (1962); 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 467;
and Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 538, 553-555 (1963).
"Under regulations and rulings implementing N.Y. AGPIc. & MARXE'rs LAw §
193 (McKinney 1954), turkey packages must contain labels setting forth the
weight of the unstuffed bird as well as the gross weight of the package. But
regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture implementing the Poultry
Products Inspection Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 441, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-69 (1964), required
the package to state merely the net weight of the turkey (including stuffing). The




ify their label so as presumably to comply with both requirements,
the companies commenced suit in a federal district court to enjoin
enforcement of the state statute as preempted by the federal enact-
ment under the supremacy clause.64 Upon receipt of the complaint,
the district judge had a three-judge court convened. Although ex-
pressing doubt as to whether they were properly convened under
Kesler, the three-judge court reserved this question until after they
had considered the merits.65 Upon resolving the substantive issue
by dismissing the complaint, the court considered whether three judges
should have been convened under Kesler, stating:6
When we reflect on what we have written, we think we have indeed
construed the [federal] Poultry Products Inspection Act.... The Kesler
case itself required consideration of the purpose and effect of [the
federal statute] .... The question therefore is not whether we have
engaged in construction of a federal statute simpliciter, but whether
we have engaged in so much more construction than in Kesler as to
make that ruling inapplicable.
After stating this question, the three-judge court avoided answering
it,67 instead, cautiously acting in a dual capacity as both a single-judge
and three-judge court, the court rendered its decree dismissing the
complaint.68
" Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In addition
to the supremacy clause contention, plaintiffs also maintained that the New York
statute violated the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection clauses. These latter contentions, however, were dismissed as
insubstantial. Consequently, only the supremacy clause allegation was in issue.
' "For reasons that will later appear, we think it best to take what might seem
the unorthodox course of discussing the merits before we address ourselves to
the puzzling question, which the parties have not disputed, whether the case is
appropriate for a three-judge court under § 2281." 230 F. Supp. at 401. The court then
devoted nine pages to the substantive issue, concluding that the complaint should
be dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to seek available administrative review.
Query, if the complaint was dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to exhaust ad-
m.nistrative remedies (i.e., administrative review of the refusal of their request
for labels which would satisfy both state and federal requirements), why did the
three-judge court indulge in statutory construction, thereby raising the Kesler
problem? Indeed, the three-judge court should not have been convened in the
first place for, if plaintiffs had administrative review available, it would seem
that federal equity jurisdiction would simply not be available. Cf. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937).
'230 F. Supp. at 409-10. The three-judge court also characterized the Kesler
majority's determination of the substantive issue as "statutory construction."
'Said the court: "If we were obliged to answer that question, we would
say we had. But we see no need to assume a task for which our litmus paper
is not sufficiently sensitive to permit an assured answer, and as to which the
consequences of a wrong decision might be so serious. ... " 230 F. Supp. at 410.
'This was noted by the Supreme Court, on review. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 114 n.4 (1965):
The three-judge court dismissed the complaint "certifying out of abundant
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Upon direct appeal, the Court immediately directed its attention to
whether three judges were properly convened below. 60 The Court was
obviously influenced by the lower court's difficulty in applying the
Kesler test; so, rather than merely apply the Kesler test to the facts
and hold that three judges were not required, the Court resolved to
reconsider Kesler, stating: 70
We think, however, that such a disposition of this important juris-
dictional question would be less than satisfactory, that candor com-
pels us to say that we find application of the Kesler rule as elusive
as did the District Court, and that we would fall short in our responsi-
bilities if we did not accept this opportunity to take a fresh look at
the problem.... Unless inexorably commanded by statute, a procedural
principle of this importance should not be kept on the books in the
name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice;
the mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the
perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great....
Concluding that the Kesler test was in fact unworkable, the Court
overruled it pro tanto. In light of the confusion which accompanied
Kesler, the Court is to be commended for its willingness to review
such a recent decision.71
Overruling Kesler was one thing; still confronting the Court was
the question of how to treat supremacy clause cases under section
2281. At one point the Court stated that pre-Kesler case law had
clearly established that supremacy clause cases were not within the
purview of the three-judge statute. 2 Nonetheless, the Court purported
caution" that the original district judge, also a member of the three-judge panel,
"individually arrived at the same conclusion." 230 F. Supp. at 410. This proce-
dure for minimizing prejudice to litigants when the jurisdiction of a three-judge
court is unclear has been used before, see Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486
[1942]....
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
7O382 U.S. at 115-16.
'tThis is not to commend the Court for overruling Kesler, however. Indeed,
Justice Douglas contended that the Court's conclusion that the Kesler test was
unsatisfactory was based upon "virtually no experience," but rather upon "the
gloomy predictions contained in a handful of Law Review articles." 382 U.S. at
133-35 (dissenting opinion). Instead, the Court might have taken the opportunity
to clarify the Kesler test.
" After reviewing Buder, Bransford, and Case, which were distinguished in
Kesler. the Court stated: "The upshot of these decisions is abundantly clear: Su-
premacy Clause cases are not within the purview of § 2281." 382 U.S. at 122. How
these same three cases can now be cited to support this statement after they were
distinguished in Kesler only three years earlier is somewhat puzzling. Consider Justice
Roberts' remarks in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669-70 (1944) (dissenting
opinion) :
The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that an-
nounced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal
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to treat the question as open, and set out to determine whether
three judges should be required in supremacy clause cases. The
Court reviewed several considerations supporting an affirmative an-
swer,7 but concluded:
74
Persuasive as these considerations may be, we believe that the reasons
supporting the ... interpretation [that supremacy clause cases are not
within the purview of section 2281] ... should carry the day. This
restrictive view ... is more consistent with a discriminating reading
of the statute itself than is the ... more embracing interpretation
[found in Kesler] ....
One familiar with the Court's attitude toward the three-judge statute
is not surprised at this conclusion.75 Nonetheless, the Court's treat-
ment of this specific question is disappointing. The Court did not
consider the strong arguments supporting the inclusion of suprem-
acy clause cases within section 2281.76 Similarly the explication of
the reasons supporting its restrictive decision was not convincing-the
Court relied upon some rather specious statutory construction,7 7 an
examination of the three-judge statute's historical purpose,7 and the
into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and
train only ....
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose
greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has
been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which
would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion,
should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the
public mind as to the stability of our institutions.
'The Court noted: (1) that, as a practical matter, there is no need to dis-
tinguish among various constitutional grounds; (2) that § 2281 speaks only of "un-
constitutionality," which certainly could embrace a violation of the supremacy clause;
(3) that "there is some policy justification for a wider rule"; and (4) that the affront
to state sensitivities is the same whether the ground of unconstitutionality is based
upon the supremacy clause or some other provision of the Constitution. 382 U.S. at
125-26.
71382 U.S. at 126.
7 See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
" The Court completely ignored any possible contemporary utility which the
three-judge court may serve. See Note, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Chang-
ing Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 YALE L.J. 1646 (1963), and text
accompanying notes 87-90 infra. Moreover, although the Court had discussed several
underlying policy justifications for the three-judge court, 382 U.S. at 116-19, it
only considered one-the affront to state dignity-when it purported to weigh the
competing considerations upon which the question in issue turned.
77382 U.S. at 126-27. The Court itself was not convinced by its construction:
"We do not suggest that this reading of § 2281 is compelled. We do say, however,
that is an entirely appropriate reading, and one that is supported by all the prece-
dents in this Court until Kesler and by sound policy considerations." Id. at 127.
The Court did not reveal these "sound policy considerations," although it did
speak of judicial administration as a "buttressing" consideration. As to this considera-
tion, see text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
78 382 U.S. at 127-28. The Court discerned that Congress was concerned with
problems which are not presented in supremacy clause cases, although the Court
candidly admitted that "an examination of the origins of the three-judge procedure
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Court's traditional concern for judicial adminstration." In short,
rather than treat the supremacy clause issue anew, the Court con-
tinued to approach three-judge cases in its traditional restrictive
manner. It is submitted that the Court's failure to make a realistic
appraisal of the contemporary utility of the three-judge requirement,
coupled with the Court's continued reliance upon an admittedly dubi-
ous concern for judicial administration,"0 detracts from an otherwise
commendable decision.
VI. THE THRE-JUDGE COURT TODAY
Conditions have markedly changed since the enactment of the
original three-judge statute in 1910; some of the considerations which
gave rise to the requirement have disappeared; 1 others have dimin-
ished in significance; 2 but many remain with continued vitality. 3
At the same time, there may be new functions that the three-judge
does not suggest what the legislators would have thought about this particular
problem...." Id. at 127. Presumably, said the Court, a supremacy clause case
"involved more confining legal analysis and can hardly be thought to raise the
worrisome possibilities that economic or political predilections will find their
way into a judgment... ." Ibid. Compare Justice Black's remarks about supremacy
clause cases in an earlier three-judge case, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941):
There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any
rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine
the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering
the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the
same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary
to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsist-
ency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions
provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard-
stick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether, under the
particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress....
"[T]his Court's concern for efficient operation of the lower federal courts
persuades us to return to the Buder-Bransford-Case rule, thereby conforming with
the constrictive view of the three-judge jurisdiction which this Court has tradition-
ally taken...." 382 U.S. at 129. [Emphasis added.]
6'After quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1962), which flatly states
that there is a "burden," the Court admits that "the number of three-judge deter-
minations each year should not be exaggerated" and cites recent statistics which
seem to suggest that the burden upon the lower federal courts is in fact infinitesimal.
382 U.S. at 128.
" The relatively uncurtailed equity power of federal judges, see text accompanying
notes 14 & 26 supra, has now been severely restricted by Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, by virtue of the Johnson Act of 1934,
28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1964), and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1964), federal courts no longer have power to enjoin the enforcement of state
public utility rate controls or state tax measures. See Note, 15 STAN L. REv. 565,
572-73 (1963). See also Comment, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 555 (1960), in which the
writer contends that the three-judge court should be abolished as no longer necessary.
See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
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court may fulfill which, although not contemplated by its originators,
should nonetheless be considered in any evaluation of section 2281 .
4
Consequently, it is submitted that any examination of the three-judge
requirement should focus upon the present need for this special tri-
bunal and weigh this against its alleged disadvantages.
Perhaps the quality and integrity of the federal judge no longer
presents a compelling consideration;"' at the same time, it should
be remembered that judges are human." Although perhaps not as
significant as in 1910, federalism remains important in such sensitive
areas of federal-state relations as civil rights and reapportionmentY
Moreover, in these cases the matter in controversy is a state statute
and of considerable importance to the state. Furthermore, questions
of constitutionality are frequently difficult and, hence, better resolved
by a more authoritative, deliberate tribunal. Consequently, it is sub-
mitted that a need does exist for a special tribunal to consider suits
involving constitutional challenges to state statutes.
Against this need, one must compare the disadvantages of the
SE.g., in Comment, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in
Federal-State Relationships, 72 YALE L. J. 1646, 1649-52 (1963), it is noted that
the three-judge court is apt to be more sensitive to the needs and objectives of
national programs. Cognizant of the increasing role of the national government,
the student suggests that the special court can fulfill a new role in federal litigation
by implementing the national policy. Such a function, however, seems inconsistent
with the three-judge court's primary role of maintaining the delicate balance of
federal-state relations.
'As pointed out in note 81 supra, the equity power of the federal judge is now
substantially curtailed. Moreover, as one author has stated: "It seems fair to
assume that men selected for the bench are capable and impartial enough to do
their job without assistance .... " Currie, supra note 62, at 2. See also Note,
72 YALE L. J. 1646, 1651 (1963). Compare BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGES (1962).
See generally MATHEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEm-
BERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 112-17 (rev. ed. 1966).
" See Jones, The Trial Judge-Role Analysis and Profile, THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC, AND THE LAW ExPLOSIoN 124-45 (1965) ; Note, Remedies For Judicial Mis-
conduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 149
(1966).
'Accord, Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 299, 303 (1963); Comment, 72 YALE L.J.
1646, 1660 (1963). By requiring three judges in certain cases under the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Congress has demonstrated the present utility of the special
tribunal. But see Comment, 27 U. CrI. L. REV. 555, 559 (1960), and compare
Comment, 72 YALE L. J. 1646, 1651-52 (1963) :
Since state and federal governmental responsibilities have shown a marked
tendency to overlap, a situation [has been created] where conflict between
national and local regulation is unavoidable.... Consequently, the need for
recognition of the superior claims of the [national interests] requires the
reconciliation of state programs to national aims. Thus, there is a current
tendency to view federalism as a process to be comprehended not in terms
of relations between the formal institutions of competing or cooperating
governments, but in terms of increasing responsiveness to the national interest
on the part of local decision makers.
The writer cited no authority for his "current tendency." Such a function would
exacerbate rather than ameliorate federal-state relations.
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three-judge requirement. Although convening three judges is cum-
bersome and disrupts the ordinary operation of the federal court
system,"5 the extent of this "disadvantage" must be kept in perspec-
tive. In 1965, less than 0.5 per cent of all trials in the federal district
courts were section 2281 three-judge cases.8 9 Thus, in terms of sta-
tistics, the three-judge requirement does not seem to constitute a sig-
nificant burden upon the lower federal courts.9 Indeed, the federal
judiciary itself seems to support this conclusion." On the other hand,
the disadvantage arising from the burden imposed upon the Supreme
Court by the obligatory direct review of three-judge determinations
presents a more serious problem.92 It is all too well-known that the
Court is unable to hear more than a small percentage of the cases
reaching it.93 As the class of cases in which Congress has provided
mandatory review increases, the number of cases which the Court may
voluntarily review necessarily decreases. Because of its ability to
grant certiorari on a case-by-case basis (as contrasted with the Con-
gressional determination which is statutory and consequently inflex-
s See note 44 supra.
DIR. ADmxl. OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN. REPORT 116, 118 (1965). In 1965, out
of 11,485 trials completed by the federal district courts, only 52 involved potential§ 2281 cases. Statistics for previous years are comparable and are summarized in
Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1658-59 (1963).
'Accord, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128 (1965) (semble). See
also Currie, supra note 62, at 12; Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 299, 305 (1963) ; Comment,
72 YALE L. J. 1646, 1658 (1963).
"Although made in 1934, the following statement by a fifth circuit judge based
upon a survey of all district court judges in the fifth circuit may well remain valid
today:
[The replies to the questionnaires] . . . showed the efficiency and flexibility
of the three-judge device in disposing, on interlocutory hearings, of the
business for which it was constituted .... It is quite evident from these reports
that while these cases do constitute an important item in the business of the
district courts, they do not create an undue burden here.
Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REv. 795, 826 (Appendix)
(1934) (emphasis added).
It appears that Judge Hutcheson's remarks continue reliable today because the
federal judiciary has not since spoken to the contrary. See Comment, 72 YALE
L. J. 1646, 1658 (1963). This silence is significant in light of the annual Judicial
Conference of Senior Circuit Justices where considerable attention is focused upon
the administration of the federal court system. See Chandler, The Administration
of the Federal Courts, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD. 182, 185, 195-97 (1948). See
also Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CoNTEmP. PRoS. 200 (1948).
L.a An aspect of this "burden" is suggested by Justice Frankfurter:[Dlirect review of District Court judgments by this Court not only expands
this Court's obligatory jurisdiction but contradicts the dominant principle of
having this Court review decisions only after they have gone through twojudicial sieves ....
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1960)(dissenting opinion). See generally FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 255-94 (1927), and Taft, The Jurisdictiot of the Supreme Court
Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1925).1 See FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrE STATES 15-16 (1961);
Hart, Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).
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ible), the Court can presumably best select which cases are appro-
priate for review on the basis of each case's importance. 4 On the
other hand, when the Court is required by Congress to hear a case
which is, in fact, of minimal importance, the Court must forego review-
ing a more important case. Consequently, to the extent that direct
review under section 1253 has this effect, a significant burden is
imposed upon the Supreme Court.
It does not follow, however, that the three-judge statute should
be strictly construed as the Supreme Court has concluded,"' or, as
one writer suggests, abolished completely." Rather than throw the
baby out with the bath, it is submitted that the solution should be
directed at the problem-the obligatory direct review of three-judge
determinations. Indeed, two commentators recently have examined the
three-judge provisions and have proposed Congressional changes in
the direct review requirement. One commentator would abolish the
direct appeal. 7 The other would restrict direct appeal to cases where
the state statute is declared unconstitutional; in other instances, appeal
would be to the circuit courts of appeal with discretionary certiorari
thereafter." Each of these proposals has merit and either would relieve
the direct review burden presently underlying most criticism of the
three-judge requirement.
VII. OTHER PROBLEMS
In addition to the burdensome obligatory direct review provisions,
other aspects of the three-judge provisions merit Congressional re-
examination. Three judges are required only when injunctive relief
is sought. 9 Yet the underlying policy considerations seem to apply
to any form of equitable relief. 00 Thus, the scope of section 2281
should be enlarged to encompass all constitutional challenges to state
statutes irrespective of the relief sought. From the outset, the three-
" Currie, sipra note 62, at 74.
'o Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941). See text accompanying notes
43-46 supra.
" Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A
Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. CHi. L. REv. 555 (1960).
"' Comment, 72 YALE L. J. 1646, 1657 (1963).
"Currie, supra note 62, at 76.
' See note 3 supra.
" For example, three judges are not required when a declaratory judgment is
sought. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mfartinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Nonetheless, the
result is the same, as a practical matter, when a statute is declared unconstitutional
irrespective of the relief granted. For an extended discussion, see Currie, supra
note 62, at 13-20.
[VoL. 41 : 856
COMMENTS
judge statute was intended to protect the states, the real defendants in
an action challenging a state statute as unconstitutional.' 0 ' Nonethe-
less, the plaintiff determines whether three judges are necessary be-
cause the courts look to his complaint to ascertain whether the re-
quisite elements of section 2281 are present.' By skillful pleading,
the plaintiff can obtain or avoid three judges, as he deems expedient. 03
Since the three-judge statute provides procedural protection for the
states, its applicability accordingly should be determined by the
states. 0 4 To achieve this objective, two recommendations are pro-
posed: first, the convening of a three-judge court should be contingent
upon a timely request by the defendant (a state officer) after receipt
of a complaint within the purview of section 2281.105 Second, the
United States Supreme Court must construe the three-judge statute
liberally in accordance with its contemporary utility in federal juris-
diction. 0
VIII. CoNCLusIoN
The three-judge statute is in need of reexamination. Congress
should first evaluate the contemporary utility of the provision. Find-
ing sufficient merit in the provision, Congress should redraft the
procedure so as to effectuate its underlying objectives.10 7 Congress
should also direct its attention to the obligatory direct review re-
quirement which is believed responsible for the Supreme Court's ex-
'x See text accompanying notes 22-31, .supra.
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTm 845
(1953); Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINx. L. Rxv. 1, 6-8
(1931).
' See, e.g., Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U.S. 168 (1929), where plaintiffs avoided the
three-judge requirement by not raising a constitutional challenge to the state
statute. The injunction was granted not upon the ground of the unconstitutionality
of the statute but for reasons of statutory construction. Mr. Justice Holmes said,
280 U.S. at 172:
The judge was clearly right in treating the plaintiffs ... as masters to decide
what they would ask and in denying to the defendants ... the power to force
upon the plaintiffs a constitutional issue which they did not care to raise.
' This assumes that the states still need and desire the protection afforded by
the three-judge court. Thus, the states would seek three judges only when they
felt their interests so demanded. By enabling the party protected by the procedure
to determine its applicability, the three-judge statute would be comparable to the
federal removal provisions.
" Accord, Currie, mipra note 62, at 77-79.
1 See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra. Even if the three-judge statute
were amended, its effectiveness would depend upon the cooperation of the Supreme
Court. In short, the Court's policy of restrictive construction would still operate
to deprive the states of the protection presumably intended by Congress.
" The supremacy clause exception of Swift & Co. v. Wickham is inconsistent
with the underlying policy of § 2281 and should be expressly abolished. Accord, Note,
11 VArN. L. REv. 569 (1966).
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press distaste for section 2281. At the same time, the Supreme Court
should reconsider its traditional restrictive position. If Congress elim-
inates the burdensome direct review requirement, perhaps the Court
will more readily reconsider its position.0'0
" As a practical matter, this writer concedes that Congress is unlikely to
respond to this plea or the more eloquent pleas of others. Consider the following
excerpt from FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPRaEME COURT
42 (1928): "Legislation affecting the judicial structure, unless it calls for whole-
sale appointments, is without the driving force of a powerful, concentrated economic,
political, or social interest."
Nonetheless, there may be some hope: "Congressional preoccupation with judicial
organization is extremely tenuous all through our history except after needs have
gone unremedied for so long a time as to gather compelling momentum for action,
or when some unusually dramatic litigation arouses widespread general interest."
Id. at 36-37.
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